

Indra Sistemas, S.A. Director Remuneration Policy

Introduction


At a meeting held on 25 May 2023, the Board of Directors of Indra Sistemas, S.A. (hereinafter interchangeably referred to as "Indra" or the "Company"), following a proposal by the Appointments, Remuneration and Corporate Governance Committee (hereinafter, the "ARCGC"), agreed to submit this policy relating to the remuneration of the members of the Board of Directors (hereinafter, the "Remuneration Policy" or the "Policy") for approval by the General Shareholders' Meeting, as a separate item on the Agenda, in accordance with the consolidated text of the Spanish Companies Act, as approved by Royal Legislative Decree 1 of 2 July 2010 (hereinafter interchangeably referred to as either the "Spanish Companies Act" or the "LSC"). This Policy came into force on the date on which it was approved by the General Shareholders' Meeting and remains in force until 31 December 2026, without prejudice to any incentives that remain pending payment and were awarded under the terms of previous policies, and notwithstanding any adjustments or updates that may be made by the Board of Directors, where applicable, pursuant to the terms of the Policy itself, and any amendments that may be approved from time to time by the General Shareholders' Meeting.

Remuneration of the members of the Board of Directors is determined in accordance with the contents of the Bylaws, the Board of Directors Regulations and the resolutions adopted by the General Shareholders' Meeting. In accordance with the provisions of Article 217 of the LSC, their remuneration is regularly reviewed to ensure that it stays reasonably proportionate to the size of the Company, its financial situation and usual market practices for comparable companies. During this review process, the Remuneration Committee (hereinafter, "RC") and the Board of Directors check that remuneration is appropriate and aligned with the amounts offered in the marketplace, and to this end it commissions remuneration studies from consultancy firms of known international reputation. In addition, when designing, structuring and implementing the various payment items covered by the remuneration system in place at any given time, the Board is careful to ensure that remuneration is directed towards fostering long-term profitability and sustainability for the Company, and it incorporates the precautionary measures required in order to prevent the excessive assumption of risk and the rewarding of unfavourable management results.

The Company's Executive Chairman receives specific remuneration for the performance of his executive duties, and this is regulated under section 5 of this Policy.

This Remuneration Policy contains the following sections:

1.	Our principles	Page 2	5.	Executive Chairman's Remuneration Policy	Page
2.	What we do	2	6.	CEO's Remuneration Policy	9
3.	Process used to define Remuneration Policy	4	7.	Remuneration Policy for directors as a result of their membership of the Administrative Body	17
4.	New developments in Remuneration Policy	6	8.	Consistency with the Company's strategy, interests and long-term sustainability	19
			9.	Validity	19





1. Our principles

Principles that apply to the remuneration of directors for their executive duties

ALIGNMENT WITH THE INTERESTS OF STAKEHOLDERS

The Policy should contribute to the application of corporate strategy and the Company's long-term sustainable growth, aligning the Company's interests with those of its shareholders.

It should encourage directors to remain with the Company and guide their management with rigour and a particular focus on the long term, while remaining reasonably linked to the performance of the share price over the same timeline.

LINK BETWEEN REMUNERATION AND RESULTS

Variable remuneration should be aligned with the corporate interest, using monitoring and measurement systems that determine the receipt of variable remuneration on the basis of appraisals that measure individual performance and personal contribution to the achievement of the targets set.

Variable remuneration should represent a substantial part of total remuneration, and medium-term remuneration should have a sufficient weighting to ensure alignment with shareholder long-term interests.

COMPETITIVENESS

Remuneration policy should be effective in attracting and retaining the highest quality professionals, ensuring that their payment is in line with best practices and conditions in the marketplace.

PROPORTIONALITY

Remuneration should be regularly reviewed to ensure that it stays reasonably proportionate to the size of the Company, its financial situation and usual market practices for comparable companies.

Principles that apply to the remuneration of directors for their membership of the administrative body

SUITABILITY

The remuneration received by external directors should be sufficient and adequate to reward their dedication, qualification and responsibility, though it should not represent an obstacle to their independence.

Given the extent to which directors are expected to attend meetings of the Board and its Committees in person, and since their dedication and availability are a primary requirement, they are paid a fixed amount, which is determined on the basis of the duties performed by each director.

PRUDENCE

Remuneration should not incorporate elements linked to profits or the Company's share price, to ensure detachment from short-term targets and variables. It should also be paid entirely in cash.

TRANSPARENCY

Levels of transparency with regard to remuneration are in line with best corporate governance practices, with the aim of engendering trust among all the Company's stakeholders, particularly its shareholders and investors.

2. What we do



WHAT WE DO

Remuneration of the Executive Chairman

The Executive Chairman receives fixed remuneration for the performance of his executive duties and fixed remuneration for the performance of his non-executive duties (chairmanship of the Board of Directors), in addition to the remuneration he may earn for chairing the Board of Directors' Committees.

Remuneration of the CEO

- Pay at risk: the majority of the remuneration paid to the CEO is variable and linked to the Company's financial results and/or the performance of its share price (pay for performance).
- Alignment of remuneration with the interests of shareholders and the Company as a whole: the proportion represented by payment in shares forms a significant part of total remuneration, in order to align the interests of the CEO with those of shareholders. Consideration is also given to the interests of the Company as a whole, in such a way that a portion of any

- variable remuneration is linked to its ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance) targets.
- Long-term incentive payable in financial instruments and linked to a multi-annual target measurement period: longterm incentive usually awarded in shares. The right to receive this incentive accrues once a minimum measurement period of three years has elapsed.
- Malus and clawback clauses: the remuneration of the CEO is subject to these clauses, which allows the Company to reduce, cancel and/or reclaim variable payments under certain circumstances.
- Permanent holding of shares: the CEO has an obligation to retain a minimum number of Indra shares equivalent to two years' gross Fixed Remuneration while he maintains a contractual relationship with the Company.
- Proportionality and risk management: Remuneration Policy ensures that the CEO has a particular interest in generating a return, both in the short term and more particularly in the long term. It also includes provisions to mitigate the taking of



inappropriate risks, such as malus and clawback clauses, with the inclusion of limits on maximum payment and compensation in the event of the termination of the contractual relationship, multiple metrics and procedures that enable the Board and the Committee to identify risk.

- Recurring external advice: for the purposes of considering market practices, as an additional element to be borne in mind when making decisions about designing Policy.
- Remuneration of directors as a result of their membership of the administrative body


Remuneration comprises a fixed amount, which is established as appropriate remuneration for the amount of time required to perform the duties required of the position in question, though without reaching levels that compromise the director's independence.

0

WHAT WE DO NOT DO

- There are no contracts with guaranteed salary increments.
- With regard to remuneration, the Policy does not discriminate on grounds of age, gender, culture, religion or race.
- There are **no guaranteed variable payments.**
- The hedging, pledging or concealed sale of shares received during the retention period is not allowed, nor can derivatives contracts be arranged in relation to the share price.
- Non-executive directors are not involved in the calculation of remuneration formulas or systems linked to the Company's results or individual performance. They do not participate in long-term savings schemes or other social welfare systems.







3. Process used to define Remuneration Policy

I. Company bodies involved

In accordance with the provisions of the Board of Directors Regulations, proposals relating to director remuneration policy (along with the specific systems to be applied, their components and amounts) are prepared by the RC, which submits them to the Board of Directors. The Board of Directors then adopts the relevant decisions, including (when appropriate) proposing that the General Shareholders' Meeting adopt resolutions in this regard, such as the amendment or approval of a new Remuneration Policy.

The following section contains a list of the duties performed by all the Company bodies that are in some way involved in reviewing, determining, applying and approving Policy:

General Shareholders' Meeting:

- This body approves Remuneration Policy at least every three years under a separate item on the Agenda.
- It approves the maximum annual remuneration amount payable to directors in their capacity as such.
- It approves the application of variable director remuneration systems that include the award of shares or share options or payments that are linked to the share price.

Board of Directors:

- With regard to the remuneration of directors in their capacity as such, and following a report from the RC, the Board of Directors approves the individual remuneration figure for each director within the framework of the Bylaws and the Remuneration Policy, taking account of the duties and responsibilities assigned to each of them.
- As regards the remuneration of Executive Directors:
 - It determines the individual remuneration payable to each director for performing the duties assigned to them, within the framework of remuneration policy and pursuant to the terms of his or her contract, following a report from the RC.
 - It reviews any proposals for the adjustment, updating or approval of Remuneration Policy that are submitted to this end by the RC, and it decides on whether or not they should be submitted to the General Meeting.
 - It approves the contracts that govern executive directors' performance of their duties and responsibilities, setting out all the items for which they may receive remuneration for the performance of their executive duties.

It should be noted that when adopting the foregoing decisions, the Board strictly adheres to all the legal provisions relating to the conduct of directors when they find themselves in situations that involve conflicts of interest, and any director who finds him or herself in such a position does not take part in any debate or vote on the issues that relate to his or her remuneration.

Remuneration Committee:

- This body proposes approval of Remuneration Policy to the Board of Directors, along with any necessary adjustments or updates. To this end, it regularly reviews Remuneration Policy and takes account of the factors listed in the following paragraph.
- It provides information on the individual remuneration to be received by directors, which must be approved by the Board of Directors.
- Propose to the Board of Directors the individual remuneration and other contractual conditions of the executive directors.
- As regards variable remuneration, the RC reviews the structure, the maximum levels of remuneration, the targets established and the specific weight of each item, taking account of Company strategy, the Company's needs and the business environment.

Sustainability Committee:

• In relation to variable remuneration, the Committee prepares its proposal for sustainability targets, and this must be approved by the Board of Directors, in accordance with the Sustainability Master Plan.

II. Criteria adopted when determining Remuneration Policy

Consideration of the opinions of shareholders and good governance recommendations

The RC takes account of the information that it receives from institutional investors and proxy advisers during the regular consultations carried out by Indra, along with the guidelines they publish in relation to remuneration.

At the same time, when preparing the remuneration system, the RC takes account of the results of votes taken in relation to remuneration policies that have been previously approved by the General Shareholders' Meeting, and the consultative votes included in the annual reports on remuneration in which these policies are applied. The backing generally expressed by shareholders for the remuneration policies proposed by the Board of Directors (given that the remunerations policy for 2021-2023 was approved with 73.17% of the vote in favour and only 0.66% against, with 26.45% abstaining (SEPI's policy of abstaining in relation to these resolutions should be borne in mind, given that it accounted for 98.98% of all abstentions)), confirms that this Policy essentially favours continuity, notwithstanding its adjustment in line with current governance structure, the remuneration practices employed by comparable IBEX-35 companies, and inclusion of the improvements deemed pertinent, as detailed in section 4 below.

In turn, the RC and the Board ensure that the Remuneration Policy is aligned with the recommendations set out in the CNMV's Good Governance Code.

Consideration of employee payment conditions

For the purposes of establishing the remuneration system set out in the Remuneration Policy, consideration has been given to the payment and employment conditions enjoyed by the Company's workers. In particular, the remunerations strategy that applies to employees has been taken into account.

In addition, when preparing Remuneration Policy, close attention was paid to the importance of ensuring that the remuneration policy for executive directors was in line with that of senior management, bearing in mind the duties and responsibilities taken on by each of these groups.

As a result of that process, this Remuneration Policy shares the following guidelines with the general payment conditions that apply to employees:

- Total payment structure: the remuneration package offered by Indra basically comprises fixed remuneration and a variable annual remuneration amount. In the case of managers, there is also medium-term remuneration and, where applicable, some payments in kind and/or deferred payments. In any case, in the remuneration policy that applies to employees in general, the fixed portion has a reasonable specific weight insofar as, in certain circumstances, the variable payment amount may end up being zero.
- Equitable remuneration: the remuneration policy applied by Indra
 does not involve any gender-related bias. Fixed monetary payments
 and variable payments are established objectively, without any
 subjective bias. Fixed remuneration primarily reflects the
 employee's experience and their level of responsibility within the
 organisation, while variable remuneration rewards the achievement
 of targets that are fundamentally quantitative and shared amongst



the employees that work in the same departments.

- Alignment of interests: a significant portion of the total remuneration of the management team is variable, and its payment is linked to the achievement of the Company's strategic objectives, in a way that incentivises robust management with a particular focus on the long term.
- Proportionality and the management of risk: levels of remuneration are consistent with the Company's importance, its financial position at any given time and market norms in comparable sectors and businesses.
 Provisions are also included to mitigate the taking of inappropriate risk.
- Values: Remuneration Policy is designed with the aim of attracting and retaining the best talent and encouraging a culture of high performance, in the same way as the remuneration strategy that applies to Company employees.

Consideration of market conditions

The remuneration paid to directors is compared with the payments received by people with comparable profiles in companies that are similar in terms of size. The remuneration paid to Non-Executive Directors is compared with the Ibex-35, excluding the companies that occupy the first ten places in the index, since their practices are clearly different from those of the rest.

The remuneration paid to Executive Directors is compared


with a sample of IBEX-35 (companies with a turnover of between €1,200M and €5,500M) and large Spanish companies with a size comparable to that of Indra.


Consideration by an independent external adviser

When determining, reviewing and implementing Remuneration Policy, the RC seeks independent advice and ensures that no director is allowed to take decisions relating to his or her own remuneration.

More specifically, when designing this Policy, the former Appointments, Remuneration and Corporate Governance Committee ("ARCGC") received external advice from Mercer Consulting, S.L. to adapt the director remuneration structure set out in this Policy, following a positive assessment of the independence of this external adviser prior to its appointment.

The Remuneration Committee regularly reviews this Policy in order to ensure that it remains in line both with the Company's situation and strategy in the short, medium and long term, as well as with current market conditions. In making its reviews, it has received advice from EY Aboqados, S.L.P.







4. New developments in Remuneration Policy

With regard to Executive Directors, this Remuneration Policy maintains the basic principles applied in the current policy approved by the General Shareholders' Meeting on 30 June 2021. However, following an evaluation of the practices employed in the sector and at comparable companies, general market trends and best practices in respect of remuneration, some new provisions have been introduced with respect to the previous Policy:

- a) New features of the Policy approved at the Ordinary General Shareholders' Meeting of 30 June 2023, and amended at the Ordinary General Shareholders' Meeting of 27 June 2024:
- The updating of the CEO's fixed remuneration, which was increased in April 2022 within the limits provided for in the 2021-2023 Remuneration Policy, in order to bring it into line with the new governance structure under which the Company moved from two joint and several CEOs to a single CEO, with the resulting increase in his duties and responsibilities.
- Provision is made for the fixed remuneration of the Executive Director IT General Manager also appointed in April 2022.
- The maximum cost of payments in kind to the CEO was updated, in order to bring these into line with market prices.
- The 3-year deferral of 30% of the Variable Annual Remuneration ("VAR") paid in the form of shares no longer applies. This change has been made in order to bring this payment item into line with the market practices employed by comparable companies and thus strengthen the Company's ability to retain, attract and recruit talent, placing Indra in a competitive position in relation to comparable companies without changing the remuneration mix (shares/cash) or any other conditions governing its receipt.
- The maximum weighting of the qualitative targets set for VAR is reduced, while the weighting of quantitative targets is increased.
- With regard to Medium-Term Incentive (MTI), the possibility of partial consolidation in the event of compliance or overcompliance with operational targets is removed, as it has been confirmed that it does not act as a tool for motivation or retention, since its application accounts for an insignificant percentage of this incentive.
- As regards the Typology of MTI targets, the main new developments are as follows:
 - The number of targets has been reduced, with the removal of those that were formerly known as "strategic plan targets", in which the Board evaluated the initiatives completed at the end of the period, since this gave rise to a discretional advantage that was very difficult to quantify.
 - The weighting of the ESG targets has been increased from 10% to 15%, in line with the Company's commitment in this area, which it considers to be strategic.
 - The set of targets entitled "Operational Performance Targets" will now be known as "Economic, Financial and Operational targets forming part of the Strategic Plan", with an increased weighting of 65%.
 - The "Action Performance Targets" are retained, with the same indicators and weighting (20%). The weighting of 10% established for the Relative TSR metric is considered reasonable, since it should be borne in mind that the Performance Share mechanism is, by its very nature, already indexed and centred on the revaluation of the share price.

- The power of the Board of Directors to modulate the final result of the variable remuneration to be paid to the CEO is restricted to a maximum of 10% upwards or downwards. Details of the exceptional circumstances that might justify the exercise of this power by the Board of Directors will be set out in the relevant Annual Remuneration Report.
- With regard to the Long-Term Savings Plan, a maximum annual contribution is established for the CEO, along with the moment at which the right to receive the amount accumulated in this Plan will be triggered (provided that his contract remains in force, and bearing in mind his age and career projection), while the maximum amount that the CEO may receive in this regard is maintained.
- With regard to the remuneration paid to directors as members of the Board and its Committees, a breakdown of the gross annual amount received by the members of the Strategy Committee (formed in September 2021) has been included. In addition, the remuneration for the Lead Independent Director is established bearing in mind the special dedication required for this position, which was set with external advice from WTW, based on the remuneration of this position in Ibex 35 companies (median of the comparison group).
- It is proposed to set the maximum annual limit of the remuneration of all the directors in their capacity as such at 2,750,000 € as it is proposed to this Meeting to increase the maximum number of members of the Board of Directors to 16.
- b) News submitted to the Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders in 2025:
 - The policy that applies to remuneration of the Chairman's executive duties is regulated in a separate section (section 5).
 - As a consequence of the termination on 20 May 2025 of the mercantile contract with Luis Abril Mazuelas, Executive Director and IT Managing Director, the provisions relating to the remuneration that he had been receiving have been removed.
 - As regards the Typology of MTI targets, the main new developments are as follows:
 - The set of targets entitled "Economic, Financial and Operational targets forming part of the Strategic Plan", with an increased weighting of 70%.
 - The maximum percentage of the target to be received for this incentive has been reduced from 150% to 125%.
 - A deferral period of one year has been established for payment of this incentive, and shares will be awarded in two tranches (50% during the first four months of 2027 and the remaining 50% the following year).
 - An essential condition linked to Indra's accumulated Free Cash Flow (in excess of €630 million) has been established in order for payment of the 2024-2026 MTI to become due.
 - With regard to the remuneration paid to directors as members of the Board and its Committees, a breakdown of the gross annual amount received by the members of the Appointments and Corporate Governance Committee and the Remuneration Committee (both of which were created in October 2024 as a consequence of the subdivision of the Appointments, Remuneration and Corporate Governance Committee) has been included.
 - The maximum annual limit on the total remuneration to be paid to all the board members in their capacity as such remains unchanged at €2,750,000, as the number of members of the



Board of Directors has remained the same.

5. Executive Chairman's Remuneration Policy

For the performance of his executive duties, the Chairman receives remuneration that only comprises fixed payment items and that amounts to €275,000.

The Chairman of the Board of Directors may be the beneficiary of an allowance in cash or in kind, including for life and accident insurance, health care and use of a company car.


A contractual notice period of three months is established in the event of unilateral termination by the Company or the Executive Chairman, and compensation equivalent to the fixed remuneration amount being received by the Chairman at the time of termination is payable for any part of the notice period that is not respected.



6. CEO's Remuneration Policy

I. Remunerative elements

The following figure shows the principal elements into which the CEO's remuneration for performing his executive duties is divided★: (i) Fixed Remuneration, (ii) Variable Annual Remuneration, and (iii) Medium-Term Remuneration:



- ★ In addition, the CEO may be the beneficiary of other payments in kind. Details are set out in Section 6.III. The CEO may also receive the remuneration that corresponds to his membership of the Board of Directors and attendance at its meetings.
- ★ Furthermore, the CEO may also participate in the Savings Plan. Details are set out in Section 6.VI.
- ★ The limits on VAR and MTR are established for the purposes of calculating the incentive amount on the date it is awarded.


II. Mixed remuneration scenarios

The Remuneration Policy offers a reasonable balance between the different fixed and variable elements (both annual and long-term), reflecting an appropriate assumption of risk combined with the achievement of defined short- and long-term targets, linked to the creation of sustainable value.

Fixed Remuneration ¹	All scenarios	€660,000
	Minimum	No incentive payment will be made
Variable Annual Remuneration ²	Target	140% of FR
	Maximum	168% of FR
Medium-Term Remuneration ²	Minimum	No incentive payment will be made
	Target	160% of FR
	Maximum	200% of FR

¹Details of the payments in kind which the CEO may receive, where applicable, are shown in Section 6.III.

The following figures show examples of total potential future remuneration for the CEO under this Remuneration Policy, with details of the proportion relating to the different elements from which it is comprised. Potential results and the premises on which they are based are shown below:





²The resulting amounts show their value on the date of award.

III. Fixed amounts for the performance of executive duties

Fixed Remuneration in cash			
Purpose	To reward performance, bearing in mind levels of responsibility and professional experience		
Amount	€660,000.		
	Fixed Remuneration will remain unchanged during the entire time that this Remuneration Policy remains in force, unless specific circumstances make a review advisable.		
	It is calculated taking account of the content of the executive duties associated with the position and comparative information on the remuneration paid by listed companies that are comparable to Indra.		
Procedure	In certain situations, the RC may, for example, recognise a change in responsibility, developments affecting a position, the amount of time that has elapsed without any increment, or issues relating to the retention of the director. Under these circumstances, following a proposal from the RC, the Board may approve an increment in the Fixed Remuneration figure. The underlying reasons will be properly justified in the relevant Annual Remuneration Report. In any case, any increments that may be agreed under the aforementioned criteria for the CEO while this Policy remains in force may not exceed 10% of the Fixed Remuneration amount shown, during the entire term of this Policy.		
	This Fixed Remuneration will be divided into 14 equal instalments, one being paid in each calendar month and the remaining two in June and December.		

Benefits in kind				
Purpose	To offer competitive benefits.			
 Life and accident insurance: the annual cost of premiums for the CEO is less than €100,000. Health insurance: the annual cost of the premium for the CEO is less than €34,000. Use of a company vehicle: the annual cost represented by this benefit afforded to the CEO is less than €60,000. 				
Procedure	 Life and accident insurance: the Company has taken out a life insurance policy to cover the CEO in case of death or disablement. Health insurance: the CEO is beneficiary of a collective health insurance policy that the Company has taken out for its senior executives. Use of vehicle: in line with the policy established to this end by the Company. 			





IV. Variable amounts for the performance of executive duties

Variable Ann	ual Remuneration
Purpose	To provide an incentive to meet the annual targets, in line with the Strategic Plan in place at any given time. Compliance with these targets, ever when they are set in the short term, is referred to in the Company's Strategic Plan, to the extent that this assists in advancing the strategy establishes by the Board of Directors to achieve sustainable and long-term growth for the Company while at the same time creating value for shareholders Likewise, the definition of these targets also takes account of non-financial parameters which, when achieved, have a similarly beneficial effect of the Company as a whole.
Amount	Target: 140% of Fixed Remuneration.
Amount	Maximum: 120% of the Target (168% of Fixed Remuneration).
	The Board of Directors will define both quantitative and qualitative targets:
	 Quantitative targets will carry a weighting of at least 60% of the incentive as a whole. They will comprise metrics that guarantee a suitable balance between the financial and operational aspects of the Company's management.
Targets and Metrics	In particular, quantitative metrics will be principally linked to the achievement of certain financial performance thresholds: order intake, fre cash flow or EBIT. In turn, metrics will also be established relating to non-financial performance. Specifically, as regards sustainability, this maconsist of reducing CO ₂ emissions, promoting diversity and innovation, among other metrics.
	 Qualitative targets will carry a maximum weighting of 40% of the incentive as a whole. These targets will mainly be linked to the appraisal of the CEO's performance and his contribution to the achievement of the creation of value.
	The RC may also propose the possibility to the Board of considering other targets and milestones that have been achieved, both quantitative an qualitative, or the application of other criteria to determine the variable annual remuneration amount. The details of any such adjustments will be broken down in the relevant Annual Remuneration Report.
	The accrual of Variable Annual Remuneration is linked to the individual performance of the CEO and the achievement of the targets set in each case.
	Targets will be defined annually by the Board of Directors, at the proposal of the RC and the Sustainability Committee (according to their area or responsibility), for the CEO, in such a way that the targets are specific, quantifiable and predetermined for each financial year. An account of the targets set by the Board of Directors for each financial year will be given in the relevant Annual Remuneration Report.
	When preparing its proposal for definition of the suitable metrics to be used to determine levels of compliance with each target, the RC will tak account of both past information on the Company's performance and projections and forecasts relating to the Company's growth, while at the same time assessing the suitable weighting for each target in consideration of the Company's strategy.
	In this regard, to determine levels of compliance, a specific compliance scale will be established for each target at the beginning of each financial year. This will include (i) a minimum threshold, below which no incentive payment will be made, (ii) a target level, which will correspond to 100° compliance with targets, and (iii) a maximum level.
Procedure	Once the financial year to which the targets apply has ended, and following a report from the RC, the Board will calculate the variable remuneration that has accrued during that financial year on the basis of the degree of compliance with both the quantitative and the qualitative targets. With the aim of ensuring that there is an effective relationship between the variable annual remuneration and the professional performance achieved by it beneficiaries, when it comes to determining levels of compliance with quantitative targets, the Board and the RC may not take into accour extraordinary results and aspects that could distort the evaluation criteria, which must be reported in the corresponding Annual Remuneration Report.
	The Board of Directors has discretionary powers to moderate the basic proposal prepared by the RC, allowing it to make changes of up to maximum of 10% (upwards or downwards) to the annual variable remuneration that is to be paid to the CEO, taking account of the quality of the results, individual performance and the existence of exceptional circumstances that arise during the course of the financial year and that require qualitative appraisal. In the event that the Board of Directors agrees to apply this qualitative change, either upwards or downwards, the Compan will provide detailed information on the reasons justifying its application in the relevant Annual Report on Director Remuneration.
	70% of the variable annual remuneration will be received in cash and the remaining 30% will be received in its entirety in the form of Compar shares, the number of which shall be set on the date on which the Board approves the variable annual remuneration to which the CEO is effective entitled. The number of shares to be awarded will be calculated on the basis of the average share price during the thirty stock market tradin sessions preceding the date of the Board's resolution. Where applicable, a cash amount equivalent to the dividends paid by the Company will be paid from the date on which the shares are allocated. The shares awarded may not be disposed of until at least 3 years have elapsed from the date on which they are awarded, unless the CEO directly or indirectly owns a number of shares equivalent to twice his Fixed Annual Remuneration.
	In addition, due to justifiable circumstances in the socio-economic environment, or due to specific circumstances involving the financial leveraging of the company, the Board of Directors may, following a proposal from the PC, agree to pay VAP in cash in its entirety. In any case, the reason

of the company, the Board of Directors may, following a proposal from the RC, agree to pay VAR in cash in its entirety. In any case, the reasons justifying this decision will be set out in the Annual Remuneration Report for the financial year in question.

The variable annual remuneration amount will be received following preparation of the annual accounts and subject to an appraisal of the external auditor's report, and in any event, within the three months immediately following the financial year-end. This will permit sufficient verification that the conditions relating to performance and any other factors that may be established have been effectively met.

As indicated in greater detail in the following Section 6.VII, the amounts pending payment in relation to variable annual remuneration may be subject to reduction or cancellation by the Company if any of the circumstances provided for in the *malus* clause arise, and the amounts paid in the form of variable annual remuneration are subject to possible recovery (clawback) for a period of two years.



IV. Variable amounts for the performance of executive duties (contd.)

Medium-Term Incentive (MTI) for the period from 2024 to 2026

The 2024-2026 MTI is a medium-term incentive (three years) that is directed towards the Company's CEO and managers who are considered to have contributed decisively to the creation of value over the reference period. The following section contains a description of the main features of the 2024-2026 MTI insofar as they affect the remuneration of the CEO.

Purpose	To incentivise the creation of sustainable value for shareholders over the long term.
Description	The 2024-2026 MTI is linked to the Company's performance in relation to implementation of the Strategic Plan "Leading the future". It takes the form of a performance share plan, with an initial allocation of shares, which may be awarded upon completion in a percentage of between 0% and 125%, calculated according to the degree to which the established targets have been met.
Term	The targets for the 2024-2026 MTI will be measured over a period of three years, and payment of this incentive will be deferred for one year. When applicable, 50% of the shares would be handed over during the first four months of 2027, with the remaining 50% handed over a year from the end of the period over which the Plan's targets are measured. The specific dates of their award will be decided by the Board of Directors or the body of individual to which/whom this duty is delegated.
Amount (in annualised terms)	 Target: 160% of Fixed Remuneration. Overall maximum: 125% of the Target (200% of Fixed Remuneration).
Maximum number of shares	As agreed by the 2024 General Shareholders' Meeting, the maximum number of shares to be awarded in this regard will be 513,806 shares, equivalent to 0.29% of the share capital at the time at which the resolution was adopted.
	The Medium-Term Incentive is structured in the form of one single cycle and is awarded in the form of shares, the award of which will depend on the level of compliance with the targets to which remuneration is linked.
Method and requirements for settlement	The accrual period is three years. Targets are linked to a compliance scale, which is specific for each target and established at the beginning of the Medium-Term Incentive period. They include: a minimum threshold, below which no incentive payment will be made; a target level, which will correspond to 100% compliance with targets; and a maximum compliance level.
	The number of shares that will be paid to each beneficiary under the 2024-2026 MTI will depend on the degree to which the established targets have been met.
	The shares awarded may not be disposed of until at least 3 years have elapsed from the date on which they are awarded, unless the CEO directly or indirectly owns a number of shares equivalent to twice his Fixed Annual Remuneration.
	Notwithstanding the fact that the 2024-2026 MTI accrues at the close of the 2026 financial year, the CEO will not receive the shares to which he may be entitled (where applicable) until the Board of Directors, following a report from the RC, makes an appraisal of the degree to which the targets set out in the section headed "Types of Targets, criteria, weightings and merits" have been met.
	An essential condition linked to Indra's accumulated Free Cash Flow (in excess of €630 million) has been established in order for payment of the 2024-2026 MTI to become due. In the event that this figure is not achieved, even if the minimum levels of compliance are reached in respect of other targets, the right to receive any kind of incentive will be lost.
Evaluation and settlement	When evaluating compliance with targets, the Board and the RC may discount any circumstances that do not relate to the ordinary course of business (such as acquisitions, restructuring, corporate transactions, etc.) and that have had an effect on the achievement of those targets and fall outside the director's direct management responsibilities. In addition, when assessing targets, the Board and the RC may give weight to other circumstances, such as the macro-economic situation or Indra's relative performance as compared with comparable market or business sectors, among other factors.
	The Board of Directors has discretionary powers to moderate the basic proposal prepared by the RC, allowing it to make changes of up to a maximum of 10% (upwards or downwards) to the annual variable remuneration that is to be paid to the CEO, taking account of the quality of the results, individual performance and the existence of exceptional circumstances that arise during the course of the financial year and that require a qualitative appraisal. In the event that the Board of Directors agrees to apply this qualitative change, either upwards or downwards, the Company will provide detailed information on the reasons justifying its application in the relevant Annual Report on director remuneration.
	The award of shares will be subject to the permanence conditions set out in the CEO's contract, notwithstanding compliance with any other conditions and requirements that may be established or any normal exceptions that may be applied for reasons of opportunity.
	The CEO may not transfer the shares received during a period of three years following their award, unless he directly or indirectly owns a number of shares that is equivalent to twice his fixed annual remuneration, or unless the Board of Directors specifically authorises them to do so due to the existence of exceptional and justifiable circumstances.
Withholding, cancellation and	With regard to the shares awarded (or to be awarded) within the framework of the 2024-2026 MTI, the Board of Directors will assess, after receiving a report from the RC, whether it should:
reimbursem	i. wholly or partially cancel the right to receive any shares that are pending award (malus), and/or
ent period	ii. be wholly or partially reimbursed for the shares awarded within twenty-four months of their award (clawback), when the circumstances provided for in the CEO's contract have arisen, as detailed in Section 6.VII of this policy.



Targets and types of targets

A combination of economic, financial, operational and strategic targets, together with sustainability targets directed towards the creation of both quantitative and qualitative long-term value for shareholders, all of which will also refer to strategic and management aspects in the medium term.

A breakdown of the targets, metrics, weightings and levels of achievement defined in relation to the MTI for the CEO is included in the resolution adopted by the 2024 Ordinary General Shareholders' Meeting, which is attached to this Remuneration Policy as a schedule.

	These targets carry a weighting of 10% of the total incentive amount, and they are intended to evaluate the CEC				
	ESG	terms of his compliance with the ESG targets in the Sustainability Master Plan.			
T		These targets carry a weighting of 20% of the total incentive amount, with 10% allocated to each of the following: Relative Total Shareholder Return (TSR), as compared with the IBEX-35 and Absolute TSR.			
Targets, criteria, weighting s and	a, Share price performanc e	 Relative TSR is the metric used to measure the performance of an investment in Indra shares over the period between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2026, as compared with the performance of an investment in the shares of the companies included in the Control Group. 			
metrics		 Absolute TSR is the metric used to measure the performance of an investment in Indra shares over the period between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2026, determined as the quotient (expressed in the form of a percentage relationship) between the eventual value of a hypothetical investment in Indra shares (with the reinvestment of any dividends or other similar payments received by the shareholder from time to time) and the initial value of that same hypothetical investment. 			
	Economic, Financial and Operational targets forming part of the Strategic Plan	These targets carry a weighting of 70% of the total incentive, and they include metrics that may relate to the EBIT, Free Cash Flow and other indicators connected with the Company's economic, financial and operational performance. The details of the targets, metrics and weightings of each of these items will be defined in accordance with the Strategic Plan approved for the period that this Policy is in force.			
	3				



V. Loans and quarantees

Indra currently has a policy for granting loans to members of its Steering Committee, of which the CEO is a member. This establishes a maximum capital amount (equivalent to two months' gross Fixed Remuneration) and repayment conditions that are fixed according to the amount of time over which the director repays the loan in question. The grant of these loans is subject to approval by the Board of Directors, following a favourable report by the RC and the formal signing of the relevant agreement provided for in the aforementioned policy.

VI. Long-Term Savings Plan

The Long-Term Savings Plan takes the form of a fixed contribution fund that is outsourced through an insurance policy. Contributions are made on an individual basis and the Company's only obligation is to make annual contributions while the contractual relationship between the CEO and the Company remains in force.

These contributions are defined as a percentage of the Annualised Total Target Remuneration (ATTR, defined as the sum of Fixed Remuneration, Variable Annual Remuneration and annualised Medium-Term Remuneration), amounting to 15% of the CEO's ATTR.

The Long-Term Savings Plan is not a pension or retirement scheme, and receipt of the amount that the CEO accrues under the Plan is contingent. The time at which the CEO will have the right to receive the accumulated amount is set down in his/her contract for the provision of executive services.

In addition, the CEO will receive the amount accumulated in the Long-Term Savings Plan in the event that his contract is still in place when he reaches the age of 65, or the age agreed by the parties in the event of an agreed extension, regardless of whether or not he continues with the Company. It will be received either as capital, as a life annuity, or as a combination of both.

The maximum amount that he can receive under the Long-Term Savings Plan is limited in all cases to 1x his ATTR.

VII. Ex-post control of variable remuneration (malus and clawback)

The CEO's contract includes a reduction, cancellation or repayment (malus and clawback) clause that entitles the Company to cancel and/or recover any variable annual remuneration, either wholly or in part, if any event or circumstance arises that results in a significant alteration or modification to its accounts, results or financial data, or to any of the other conditions on which the grant of variable annual remuneration is based, in such a way that the data in question does not give a true picture of the Company's situation or profitability, or the actual performance of the CEO, regardless of whether or not the director is subject to some kind of liability.

The situations which may trigger the application of these clauses include, but are not limited to, the following events:

- Material restatement of the Company's and/or of the CEO's business units' financial statements, when determined by the Company's external auditor, unless this is due to regulatory changes to the accounting legislation.
 - Existence of alterations or inaccuracies in the business

- data that are relevant for the purposes of variable remuneration and are confirmed by the Company's external auditors.
- Serious breach of the Company's internal regulations and policies by the CEO. In this regard, a breach by the CEO of the Company's Code of Ethics and Legal Compliance and its implementing regulations contained in the Indra Compliance Program will be regarded as a serious breach.

The clawback clause may be applied by the Board during the two years following the payment or recognition of the variable remuneration.

VIII. Policy relating to the holding of shares

The CEO must retain ownership of a number of Company shares (including those awarded in the form of remuneration) that is equivalent to two years' gross Fixed Remuneration while he remains in his post.

A period of six years from his appointment is established in order to reach this target.

In the event that this target is not reached, the net shares received, where applicable, as the result of any variable remuneration item shall be subject to a withholding period of at least 3 years.

IX. Main contractual terms and conditions

The contract that governs the relationship between the CEO and the Company is mercantile in nature, with an indefinite term, and it includes the clauses which are usually contained in these types of contracts under normal business practices.






Compensation in the event of termination of the contractual relationship:

	Advance notice	Indemnification	
Voluntary unilateral withdrawal by the CEO	3 months' advance notice. In the event that this term is breached, the Director must compensate the Company. Compensation will be equivalent to his ATTR for the notice period that is not served.	Not applicable.	
Voluntary unilateral termination by the Company*	3 months' advance notice. In the event that this term is breached, the Company must compensate the	Compensation equivalent to one year of the CEO's ATTR.	
Termination at the request of the CEO due to a significant change to his duties or the conditions in which his or her services are rendered	CEO. Compensation will be equivalent to his ATTR for the notice period that is not served.		

^{*} The CEO will not be entitled to collect this compensation when his contract is terminated as the consequence of a serious and culpable breach by the CEO of his legal, statutory or contractual obligations, provided that the breach in question is duly proven and confirmed by the courts in the event of any disagreement.

Exclusivity and no competition:

The CEO's contract includes a post-contractual non-compete clause for a period of one year following termination of his relationship with the Company, compensated in an amount equivalent to 0.75 times his ATTR.





X. Remuneration policy applicable to the Executive Director, Managing Director of IT

On 20 May 2025, Indra's Board of Directors mutually agreed with Executive Director and IT Managing Director Luis Abril Mazuelas to terminate the agreement for the provision of executive services under which he had been working with the Company, with effect from 25 June 2025.

The remuneration payable to Mr Abril through to the termination of his mercantile contract is governed by the terms set out in the Remuneration Policy in force during his term. The incentives that remain pending settlement under the terms of the said Policy will be paid in accordance with the terms set out therein.

XI. Remuneration Policy for New Appointees

In fixing the compensation plan for a new Executive Director, the Board and the RC take account of the candidate's experience and know-how, their provenance (from inside or outside the Company) and their compensation level at the time of appointment. Compensation is to be determined in all cases on the basis of the criteria, components and limits provided for in the present Compensation Policy.

In order to attract candidates from outside the Company, special incentives may be established to compensate for income lost due to early termination at the previous company. In order to calculate these special incentives, equivalent financial and performance terms will be established, based on targets that are similarly demanding or difficult (and on whether these would have been expected to have been met at the previous company), along with the period over which they are to be measured. These targets and the degree to which they have been met will be set out in detail and properly justified in the relevant Annual Remuneration Report. This type of compensation may be either fully or partially paid in the form of shares, subject to the allocation limits approved by the General Shareholders' Meeting from time to time.

In the event of promotions from within the Company, the Committee may cancel and/or pay out pre-existing incentives and other obligations which may be in effect at the time of appointment.

In the event that the new appointment means an international assignment, the general policy of the Company for international assignments will apply.





7. Remuneration Policy for directors as a result of their membership of the Administrative Body

Pursuant to the contents of Article 27 of the Bylaws, the remuneration paid to directors as a result of their membership of the Administrative Body may take the form of a fixed amount and subsistence payment for attendance, and it will be paid entirely in cash.

I. Maximum limit for the total remuneration of the Board of Directors

As set out in the Bylaws and Article 529 *septdecies* of the Spanish Companies Act, the maximum annual amount of this remuneration is fixed by the General Shareholders' Meeting through its approval of the Remuneration Policy in which it is established.

To this end, it is proposed to fix the maximum annual limit on the remuneration paid to all the directors for their membership of the Administrative Body in the amount of €2,750,000. This maximum limit is established on the basis of the average remuneration paid per director and the maximum number of directors and committee members provided for in the Bylaws. This limit will remain in place until the General Shareholders' Meeting agrees to its modification.

Subject to the aforementioned limit, and prior a report from the RC, the Board of Directors shall be responsible for individually setting the remuneration to be paid to each Director for their membership of the Administrative Body, within the statutory framework and in accordance with the criteria set out in this Remuneration Policy.

II. Remuneration for Directors as a result of their membership of the Administrative body

The following paragraphs contain a breakdown of the main elements included in the Director Remuneration Policy as a result of their membership of the Administrative Body.

Remuneration comprises a fixed amount, which is established as appropriate remuneration for the amount of time required to perform the duties required of the position in question, though without reaching levels that compromise the director's independence. The criteria for distributing the maximum annual remuneration amount established in this Policy are based solely on directors' membership of the Board and its Committees and on the positions they hold on each of those bodies.

The gross annual amounts are as follows:

- For membership of the Board: €80,000.
- For membership of the Auditing and Compliance Committee: €40,000.
- For membership of the Appointments and Corporate Governance Committee: €24,000.
- For membership of the Remuneration Committee: €24,000.
- For membership of the Sustainability Committee: €24,000.
- For membership of the Strategy Committee: €24,000
- For membership of the Executive Delegate Committee: €24,000
- The chairs of each Committee will receive 1.5 times the amounts indicated.

<u>Lead Independent Director:</u> Bearing in mind the importance of the duties and responsibilities required of this position, along with the amount of time to be devoted to these duties, gross annual remuneration is set at €30,000. This remuneration figure is based

on information provided by WTW on the remuneration received by people in this post at Ibex 35 companies, and the amount established represents the average for this control group.

Chair of the Board of Directors: Bearing in mind the particular dedication required to perform the duties inherent in the position of Chairman of the Board of Directors, the fixed gross annual remuneration payable for his non-executive duties amounts to €275,000, which includes the amount due for his membership of the Board (€80,000), to which remuneration for his membership of some of the Board's Committees will be added.

These amounts are included within the annual maximum limit referred to in section I above.

The Board may modify the foregoing amounts, subject in all cases to the maximum limit approved by the General Meeting for the Board as a whole in this Remuneration Policy.

The fixed amount will be paid entirely in cash.

As already indicated, the Bylaws establish that the remuneration of directors as a result of their membership of the Administrative Body may also comprise a subsistence allowance for attending meetings, and the Board may therefore also establish this, subject in all cases to the maximum limit approved by the General Meeting in this Remuneration Policy.

As mentioned above, this remuneration does not include elements linked to profits or the Company's share price, to ensure detachment from short- term targets and variables, and it is paid entirely in cash.

Remuneration Policy for directors as a result of their membership of the Administrative Body does not cover the grant of loans, advances or guarantees by the Company to directors. Nor does it cover participation by non-executive directors in social welfare schemes.

The Company's directors do not have the right to receive any kind of compensation in the event of the termination of their duties as director. They also do not have the right to any other remuneration in addition to the amounts described in this section.

The Company has taken out a civil liability insurance policy to cover its directors.

III. Remuneration applicable to new directors

In the event that new non-executive members join the Board of Directors during the term of this Policy, the remuneration system described in this section will apply. In the event that a non-executive director with a different role and responsibilities is appointed, their remuneration will be compared and established on the basis of comparable profiles in companies of similar size and complexity. All of the above is subject to the maximum limit approved by the General Meeting for the whole Board in this Remuneration Policy.



8. Consistency with the Company's strategy, interests and long-term sustainability

The weighting of the individual payment items described in section 6. If and the procedures employed to determine targets and assess compliance with those targets represent objective measures for the reduction of exposure to excessive risk, and they allow the remuneration of the CEO to be aligned with the Company's objectives, values and long-term interests.

The Corporate Governance system, internal regulations, control systems and compliance programmes implemented by the Company establish specific supervisory mechanisms and counterbalances that are designed to prevent the ability to take decisions from becoming concentrated in areas that may involve the assumption of high levels of risk for the Company, and to prevent and, where necessary, properly manage any situations of conflict of interest that may arise.

In addition, as indicated in section 6.VII, the contract of the CEO includes malus and clawback clauses.

As regards medium-term remuneration, this is defined within a multiannual framework, in order to ensure that the assessment process is based on long-term results and that the Company's underlying economic cycle is taken properly into account. This remuneration is awarded on the basis of value creation, in such a way that the interests of the CEO are properly aligned with those of the Company's shareholders.

In addition, to strengthen CEO's commitment to the Company's long-term interests and his alignment with the interests of shareholders, this policy includes a requirement for the permanent holding of a minimum number of shares, as described in Section 6.VIII.

Finally, the specific measures employed to identify and manage any potential conflicts of interest are established in the Board of Directors Regulations.



The Board of Directors, following a proposal from the former ARCGC, submitted this new Remuneration Policy for approval by the 2023 Ordinary General Shareholders' Meeting, doing so before the end of the final year to which the previous policy applied, which covered the years 2021, 2022 and 2023. An amendment to this Policy was subsequently submitted for approval by the 2024 Ordinary General Shareholders' Meeting for the sole purpose of reflecting the Chairman's inclusion under the category of executive director (while maintaining his payment conditions), together with the remuneration allocated to the Executive Delegate Committee. The Policy is once again being amended for submission to the 2025 Ordinary General Shareholders' Meeting in order to clarify the way in which the Chairman's remuneration is to be allocated to his executive and non-executive duties, as well as to remove the provisions relating to the remuneration that was being received by the Executive Director and IT Managing Director as a consequence of the termination of the mercantile contract under which he had been working with the Company, to reflect the characteristic aspects of the 2024-2026 MTI approved at the 2024 Ordinary General Shareholders' Meeting, and to give details of the remuneration received by the members of the Appointments and Corporate Governance Committee and the RC created in October 2024 as the result of the subdivision of the ARCGC.

These measures also determine the code of conduct that is

applicable to members of the Board of Directors.

This new Remuneration Policy came into force from the date on which it was approved and will remain in force for the following three financial years (2024, 2025 and 2026), except as regards the incentives that are pending settlement and were awarded under the terms of previous policies. These have been settled in accordance with the terms of those policies, though the RC may propose a new policy to the Board of Directors, for approval by the General Shareholders' Meeting on an earlier date, if deemed appropriate.

